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ABSTRACT	  
THE INFLUENCE OF ANGER ON IMPLICIT BIASES 
 
 
Katherine Reiter, B.A. 
Marquette University, 2013 
 
 
 Interpretation of ambiguous information is influenced by anxious (Richards, 
Reynolds, & French, 1992) and depressive (Wisco, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010) 
symptoms. Emotion regulation strategies, and in particular, cognitive reappraisal has 
shown to be effective at reducing feelings of distress (Denson, Grisham, & Moulds, 
2011).  The current study seeks to understand the extent that emotion regulation can 
influence interpretation bias, thoughts and behaviors.  In the current study, participants 
underwent both Angry and Neutral mood inductions. For each mood condition, 
participants were instructed to cognitively reappraise and attend to their emotions. 
Participants rated the degree of negative affect they experienced, and completed 6 
sentence completion items to assess interpretation bias. Results indicated that participants 
exhibited an increased negative interpretation bias in the Angry condition relative to 
baseline. Following reappraisal, participants rated less negative affect in the Angry 
condition. Though, reappraisal did not change interpretation bias. However, self-report 
data indicated that individuals who tend to struggle to engage in emotion regulation 
techniques and those who endorsed higher levels of state anger, both showed greater 
negative affect following cognitive reappraisal and an increased negativity bias. 
Participants who reported that they engaged in cognitive reappraisal during the mood 
induction, exhibited an increased positivity bias. Results from this study indicate that 
cognitive reappraisal is an effective strategy to reduce feelings of negativity in an angry 
mood state, however, participants are still at risk for displaying a negative interpretation 
bias to ambiguous information.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 	  	  
Individuals frequently encounter and manage ambiguous situations in everyday 
life. Whether it be hearing a noise in the middle of the night or deciding to report 
suspicious luggage at an airport, the way individuals interpret and respond to ambiguity is 
partly impacted by the emotions they experience (Andrade & Ariely, 2009), and partly by 
the way they manage their emotions (Barazzone & Davey, 2009). When individuals are 
prone to respond to ambiguity in a certain way (i.e. positive or negative), it is known as 
an interpretation bias (Huppert, Foa, Furr, Filip, & Mathews, 2003).  Understanding the 
interaction between emotional state, interpretation bias, and emotion regulation is a 
highly relevant topic that can aid in understanding the ways individuals manage everyday 
life and perhaps help to understand the facets that lead to both adaptive and maladaptive 
behavior in individuals.  
There are several different forms of interpretation biases, including threat bias, 
negative bias, and more. These different biases are indicative of cognitive processes that 
maintain certain psychopathologies, such as general anxiety (Richards, Reynolds, & 
French, 1992; Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006) social anxiety (Franklin, 
Huppert, Langner, Leiberg, & Foa, 2005; Huppert et al., 2007), and depression (Everaert, 
2012). Those who display such biases are more likely to interpret ambiguous information 
as negative or threatening, thus increasing the likelihood that they misinterpret a situation 
and behave in maladaptive ways. Further, these biases are likely to be indicative of other 
cognitive processes that reinforce maladaptive cognitions. For example, Wisco et al. 
(2010) provided a set of situations to their participants (e.g. You called a friend and left a 
message asking to get together. Several days pass and you have not heard from this 
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friend). They then instructed depressed and non-depressed participants to think of several 
explanations for each situation and select the one that most likely fit. Results from this 
study revealed that depressed participants were more likely to generate and select 
negative interpretations for each scenario. The authors posit that generating and selecting 
negative responses reinforced maladaptive thinking that aids in the maintenance of 
depressive symptoms.  
To examine interpretation bias in laboratory settings, researchers often utilize 
homograph tasks (Hertel & El-Messidi, 2006; Richards, Reynolds, & French, 1992), or 
sentence completion paradigms (Barton, Morley, Bloxham, Kitson, & Platts, 2005; 
Huppert, Pasupuleti, Foa, & Mathews, 2007; White, Suway, Pine, Bar-Haim, & Fox, 
2011). Homograph tasks are usually introduced as spelling tasks. They begin by orally 
presenting a list of words that have multiple meanings of different valences (e.g. die/dye). 
The participant is then instructed to spell the word, which allows investigators to see the 
lexical interpretation of the word and thus the participant’s interpretation bias. The 
advantage to this model is that this task is a straightforward and automatic assessment of 
interpretation bias, however, it does not allow researchers to account for the participant’s 
common lexical usage. For example, in the previous example, if the participant is 
someone who has an interest in hair styling, results could be confounded by her/his 
lexical usage and does not provide accurate information regarding the presence or 
absence of an interpretation bias.  
Sentence completion paradigms are also used to assess interpretation bias. For 
example, Huppert et al. (2007), measured threat interpretations in socially anxious 
individuals by presenting participants with ambiguous sentences that have the last word 
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missing. Participants were asked to generate responses to disambiguate the sentence. 
Across similar studies, participants who were high in social anxiety were more likely to 
respond with negative or anxious answers than participants who were low in social 
anxiety, which is indicative of an interpretation bias (Franklin, Huppert, Langner, 
Leiberg, & Foa, 2005; Wisco, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010). Thus, sentence completion 
tasks were effective in identifying interpretation biases in this population. The advantage 
of this type of task is that it allows for investigators to control the context of a situation. 
For example, using homographs can be susceptible to a participant’s lexical bias as in the 
previous example (a hairdresser spelling dye/die). But, an item from a sentence 
completion task might read, “Jenna found a stray kitten that was sick, she nursed the 
animal overnight and thinks it will likely _____”. In the latter example, the participant 
will not be confused about the lexical usage of the words and results will be more 
indicative of a true interpretation bias. 
Several studies have found that transient emotional states also influence 
interpretation bias (Barazzone & Davey, 2009; Berna, Lang, Goodwin, & Holmes, 2011; 
Gorn, Pham, & Sin, 2001). Barazzone and Davey (2009) induced angry, anxious, happy, 
or neutral mood states using guided imagery vignettes and music. Researchers gave 
participants a homophone spelling task and found that individuals who were in angry or 
anxious mood states were more likely to endorse the threatening version of the 
homophone as compared to participants who were induced to be in happy or neutral 
mood states. These results remained significant after controlling for trait anxiety and 
anger, suggesting that transient emotions play a large role in assessing ambiguous stimuli, 
even after accounting for emotional traits.  
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Transient moods and interpretation bias are also found to play a role in real-world 
applicable situations. For example, Gorn et al. (2001) asked participants to rate 
advertisements that had an ambiguous tone following pleasant or unpleasant mood 
inductions. Results showed that individuals who were induced in a pleasant mood rated 
the ambiguous advertisements as more positive when in a pleasant mood. As such, the 
literature shows that transient emotions influence the resolution of ambiguity both in 
terms of lexical disambiguation and object evaluation.  
In general, emotions give us information regarding a situation to aid in the 
decision-making process (Gross & Thompson, 2007). However, relying on dysregulated 
emotions to aid in the decision making process can result in poor choices (Fenton-
O’Creevy, Soane, Nicholson, & Willman, 2010). For instance, affect and decision 
making have been examined in risky behaviors (excessive gambling, reckless driving, 
etc.) and in efficacy of decision making (i.e. money earned in a gambling task) 
(Blanchette & Richards, 2010). Researchers found that feelings of anxiety guide us to 
avoid risk (Blanchette & Richards, 2010), while anger makes us perceive risk as less 
likely and we thus make risky decisions (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Research has shown 
that anger is a particularly complex emotion in terms of decision making. Specifically, 
Anger guides individuals to feel negative about their past, optimistic about the future, and 
pessimistic in the intentions of others. Such individuals experience more confidence and 
thus are unlikely to generate alternative decisions, and lack the ability to approach a 
situation with rationality and objectivity (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006), thus putting these 
individuals at higher risk for making maladaptive decisions.  
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Emotion regulation is an important process that allows us to manage our emotions 
to a wide variety of stimuli (Gross, 2002). Emotion regulation may involve increasing, 
decreasing or maintaining an emotional response and is usually consistent with an 
individual’s goals and expectations for a given situation (Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011; 
(Gross & Thompson, 2007). There are several benefits to successful emotion regulation.  
For example, emotion regulation permits individuals to convey desired information to 
others regarding internal states and to behave within social norms (Gross & Thompson, 
2007). Consequently, individuals who successfully regulate their emotions tend to 
experience a higher quality of social relationships than those who do not (Lopes et al., 
2011). In addition to social functioning, Gross and John (2003) found that individuals 
who engage in successful emotion regulation techniques tend to be more optimistic, 
experience greater satisfaction in life, and have higher self-esteem than those who do not 
engage in effective emotion regulation techniques.  
There are several different strategies that can be implemented to regulate 
emotions; however, not all strategies are equally successful in changing the impact of the 
emotional experience. The following is a discussion of these emotion regulation 
strategies, beginning with the least effective.  ‘Situation selection’ occurs at the beginning 
of the emotion generative process, and is the process by which individuals choose to 
avoid settings that are likely to produce unwanted emotions (Gross & Thompson, 2007). 
Implementation of this strategy requires the ability to predict the timing and specific 
unwanted emotions that a situation might evoke. This strategy is healthy and protective in 
the short-term, however, when using this strategy regularly, situations that should be 
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eventually confronted are ignored, thus making this a maladaptive long-term emotion 
regulation strategy (Gross & Thompson, 2007).  
Situation selection is an antecedent-focused emotion regulation strategy, but other 
strategies attempt to manage affect once an emotional event has been experienced. 
‘Behavioral Suppression’ is a strategy that occurs at the end of the emotion generative 
process, after the emotion is experienced. This strategy works to inhibit behavioral and 
physiological responses to the emotion (Sheppes & Gross, 2011). This strategy is often 
adaptive in social situations (Haga, Kraft, & Corby, 2009) in which it is important to 
inhibit the communication of certain emotions and reactions that are counterproductive to 
one’s goals. For example, when sitting in a professional meeting and an unfavorable 
decision has been made, it is important to manage emotions in a way that maintains 
professional demeanor in this setting. The use of response modulation would conceal 
initial feelings of anger that may arise by sitting still with a calm facial expression, 
instead of shouting in frustration. Unlike situation selection, with response modulation, 
the individual experiences the emotion. However similar to situation selection, several 
negative outcomes related to suppression have been recorded. In particular, this strategy 
is thought to be highly taxing, as it requires a great deal of cognitive resources (Sheppes 
& Gross, 2011). Suppression is associated with poor memory and high physiological 
arousal. Further, the negative emotion is still experienced, just the expression has 
changed (Sheppes & Gross, 2011). Moreover, it has been shown that individuals who 
habitually engage in Suppression have negative well-being outcomes, such as depressed 
mood, negative affect and less satisfaction with life (Haga et al., 2009).  
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 Where situation selection occurs prior to the elicited emotion, and response 
modulation occurs at the end of the emotion experience, cognitive reappraisal is a 
technique that takes place during the emotional experience. The aforementioned 
strategies are useful in controlling exposure to emotions and communication of emotional 
states; however neither effectively manages the internal experience of emotion. On the 
other hand, cognitive reappraisal is a method used to change the perception of an 
emotional stimulus to alter its impact on an individual (Gross & Thompson, 2007).  
While this strategy is understood to mean that the individual changes their 
perception of a situation, it has been interpreted in several ways. In one study, 
participants engaged in cognitive reappraisal while watching a distressing film. 
Instructions encouraged participants to take a detached and unemotional approach to the 
film that would remove the emotional context in order to decrease the degree of negative 
emotion they felt (Gross, 1998). However, another study examining cognitive reappraisal 
worded the instructions differently. Specifically, participants were shown negative 
pictures and instructed to reinterpret it to be less negative (Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & 
Gabrieli, 2002). While these studies may have inadvertently encouraged participants to 
utilize different strategies, both studies found that participants who reappraised their 
emotions reported a decrease in negative affect compared to trials where they did not 
implement cognitive reappraisal. 
Despite the efficacy of decreasing negative affect with both instruction types, 
differences in experimental procedures within the literature complicate the definition of 
cognitive reappraisal, such that different instructions may lead researchers to study 
different emotion regulation processes with the same name. For example, in the study by 
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Ochsner et al. (2002) where participants reappraised negative images using explanations, 
any positive association they generate may encourage them to reinterpret negative stimuli 
as more positive as opposed to less negative. Both processes technically fall under the 
premise of cognitive reappraisal, such that the interpretation of the event is changed, but 
the studies use different processes. McRae, Ciesielski, and Gross (2012) highlight the 
issues of using instructions that encourage participants to increase positive emotions and 
decrease negative emotions under the same construct. In this study, participants were 
asked to reappraise their emotions toward negative pictures by either increasing their 
positive emotions or decreasing their negative emotions. Results showed that participants 
reported less negative affect and showed less of a decrease in skin conductance in the 
increase positive emotion condition compared to participants in the decrease negative 
emotions group. Results indicated that ‘increase positive’ was associated with greater 
reduction of subjective ratings of negative affect, but fewer physiological changes, which 
indicates that this strategy was not effective at reducing physiological arousal associated 
with negative emotions. In contrast, ‘decrease negative’ was associated with both 
subjective decrease in negative affect, and a decrease in physiological arousal. This study 
shows that different instruction types have different affective and physiological 
consequences.  
Given the aforementioned findings, the current study defines cognitive reappraisal 
as reinterpreting the content of negative stimuli to be less negative. An example of this 
strategy is when an individual, who is nervous about receiving an injection due to a fear 
of needles, reinterprets the situation as a short, standardized procedure with minimal 
risks. Ray, Ochsner, McCrae, and Gross (2010) demonstrated the benefit of this strategy. 
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In this study, participants viewed pictures that were negative in valence and high in 
arousal. Participants were instructed to reframe their thoughts to either increase or 
decrease their negative feelings, or just attend to the content of the picture. The authors 
found that the cognitive reappraisal technique used to minimize negative feelings 
successfully decreased negative emotions compared to trials where participants were 
asked to increase their emotional responses.  
The current study focused on cognitive reappraisal and interpretation bias in 
angry mood states. Anger has been found to be associated with several psychopathologies 
including depression (Pasquini, Picardi, Biondi, Gaetano, & Morosini, 2004), social 
anxiety (Erwin, Heimberg, Schneier, & Liebowitz, 2003), and eating disorders (Waller et 
al., 2003). Anger is also implicated in negative health outcomes. Specifically, Denollet, 
Gidron, Vrints, and Conraads (2010) found that suppressed anger was associated with 
more serious cardiac events than the presence of anger alone. Other research has shown 
that anger influences biological mechanisms on a more cellular level. For example, 
Gouin, Kiecolt-Glaser, Malarkey, and Glaser (2008), found that individuals who had high 
levels of anger control, were likely to experience a shorter duration of blister healing, 
than those who were low in anger control. Further, the majority of these studies have 
discussed that greater than the presence of anger alone, anger dysregulation is associated 
with poorer outcomes (Erwin et al., 2003; Waller et al., 2003; Denollet et al., 2010; 
Gouin et al., 2008).   
Previous literature has found that emotion regulation, and in particular, cognitive 
reappraisal is effective in regulating explicit ratings of anger (Ray, Wilhelm, & Gross, 
2008; Scasz, Szentagotai, & Hofmann, 2011) and results in better cardiovascular 
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responses (Mauss, Cook, Cheng, & Gross, 2007). While these studies are encouraging, 
there are no known studies that examine anger regulation and interpretation bias together. 
What has been established is the ability to manipulate interpretation bias (Wilson et al., 
2006). . In an experimental paradigm, the researchers trained healthy participants to use a 
threatening or nonthreatening interpretation of stimuli. Participants then watched an 
anxiety-inducing video clip. Results indicated that participants who were induced to have 
a threatening interpretation bias rated significantly more anxiety and depression from 
before and after the film clip, compared to participants with a nonthreatening 
interpretation bias. This study indicates that interpretation bias can play a causal role in 
distressing symptoms. Further, that it can be induced indicates that perhaps we can also 
systematically change the interpretation bias, using emotion regulation strategies, to 
decrease the distressing emotion. Another example that interpretation bias is can be 
manipulated comes from a study demonstrating that social phobics displayed greater 
negative interpretation bias than treated social phobics who had greater bias than 
controls.  (Franklin et al., 2010) This finding demonstrates that interpretation bias is 
correlated with changes in cognitions and behaviors.   
Through examining interpretation bias in conjunction with cognitive reappraisal, 
we can examine the extent that emotion regulation influences the interpretation of 
ambiguity. Specifically, if results indicate that angry participants display a negative 
interpretation bias, however, following cognitive reappraisal, the interpretation bias 
becomes more neutral or positive, we can then conclude that individuals who regulate 
their emotions subjectively feel less negative, and further, respond to ambiguity similar to 
individuals in more neutral mood states.  
11	  
As such, if we can better understand the regulation of anger, it would help guide 
treatment in a variety of psychopathologies and inform health outcomes. An advantage to 
the current study design, is that mood manipulations will take the form of 
autobiographical recall, which allows us to directly examine the efficacy of emotion 
regulation techniques on managing emotions from life events, similar to what is 
experienced in a therapeutic setting.  
A. Specific Aims 
  
 
The present study aims to address four specific facets of emotion regulation and the 
interpretation of ambiguous information.   
1. To determine whether mood impacts interpretation bias, we will evaluate the 
effect of angry and neutral mood on a sentence completion task. Mood-based 
interpretation bias will be established if the valence of the responses on the 
sentence completion task between angry and neutral states is significantly 
different. We hypothesize that participants will choose more negative answers 
following the angry mood induction than following the neutral mood induction.  
2. To assess the efficacy of the cognitive reappraisal strategy on an angry mood 
state, we will compare subjective ratings of negative affect after angry mood 
inductions, in which participants reappraise their emotions (Angry Reappraise), 
compared to ratings of angry mood inductions when participants do not attempt to 
alter the emotional reactions (Angry Attend).  We hypothesize that the Angry 
Reappraise condition will result in less negative affect than the Angry attend trial. 
3. To evaluate whether cognitive reappraisal has an impact on mood-based 
interpretation bias, we will compare the endorsed choice of ambiguous sentences 
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following ‘Anger Attend’ and ‘Anger Reappraise’ trials. We hypothesize that 
individuals will choose the negatively valenced answer more often following the 
‘Anger Attend’ trial than the ‘Anger Reappraise’ trial.  
4. To understand whether state and trait mood features such as anxiety and anger, as 
well as effective use of emotion regulation impacts the efficacy of laboratory 
emotion regulation techniques, we will evaluate scores from self-report measures 
to determine if participants differ in subjective ratings of emotion regulation 
success and interpretation bias following laboratory procedures designed to 
reduce negative emotionality following reappraisal of angry mood states.  
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II. METHOD 
 	  
A. Participants  
  
 
Participants included 103 Marquette undergraduate students who were recruited 
through the Marquette University’s Research Participant pool and received course credit 
for their participation. The mean age of the sample was 19 years and ranged from 18 to 
23 years. Sixty-three percent of the sample was white and 56% were female. All 
participants met inclusion criteria for this study and denied being under the care of a 
psychiatrist or a psychologist or used medication for the treatment of any Axis I mood 
disorder. Experimental procedures were approved by Marquette’s Internal Review Board 
and written informed consent was obtained from each participant prior to beginning the 
experiment.  
B. Materials 	  	  
Mood Induction Each participant underwent an angry and a neutral mood 
induction procedure (MIP). In the Anger MIP, participants were instructed to recall a 
time in which they felt extremely angry, and when recalling the event they still feel 
strong frustration, irritation, and / or anger. In the Neutral MIP, participants were 
instructed to think about their morning daily routine (e.g. getting ready for school or 
work). In each MIP, participants were instructed to write about this memory in the form 
of a narrative and recall details about the event. Participants were given 5 minutes to 
write about the event, but were able advance if they finished before the allotted time. 
After writing each narrative, participants were asked to reflect and re-experience the 
memory they recalled for 30 seconds.  Several studies have found that the use of 
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autobiographical recall is an effective technique to induce targeted emotions (Jallais & 
Gilet, 2010; Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011) 
C. Emotion Regulation Task  	  	  
Training. To acquaint participants with the emotion regulation task, they were 
first given an explanation of the difference between ‘Attend’ and ‘Reappraise’ trials. 
Specifically, when the words ‘Attend’ appeared, participants were instructed to view the 
photo and allow themselves to experience any emotions that surfaced without trying to 
alter them. For the reappraise instruction, participants were told to re-interpret the content 
of the picture to be less negative. When participants were instructed to Reappraise a 
Neutral photograph, they were told that despite the neutral content of the stimulus, that it 
was still possible to reinterpret the content to be less negative. Standardized pictures from 
the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005) were 
used during this phase so that stimuli and instructions were the same across participants. 
Participants viewed 2 different sets of standardized pictures (1 Neutral/Attend, 1 
Neutral/Reappraise, 1 Negative/Attend, and 1 Negative/Reappraise). The first set was 
viewed with the experimenter (and instruction) and the other set was viewed alone, in 
order to practice the strategies.  
Experimental. In the experimental procedures, participants underwent the MIP 
prior to emotion regulation instructions. Just as in training, when participants were shown 
the ‘Attend’ prompt, they paid attention to the emotions that surfaced as a result of the 
MIP. When participants were shown the ‘Reappraise’ prompt, they were asked to 
reappraise their view of the story to decrease negative emotions. For example, if a 
participant were to write about her/his mother being late to her/his high school 
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graduation, s/he could reinterpret the feeling as gratitude that the mother took the time to 
check on the final details of the graduation party to make it successful. In ‘Reappraisal’ 
trials, participants were instructed to write their reinterpretation of the Angry MIP. As in 
the training phase, prior to and following both ‘Attend’ and ‘Reappraise’ prompts, 
participants were asked to rate the degree of negative affect they were currently 
experiencing on a Visual Analogue Scale.  
Mood Booster Because of the counterbalanced nature of this design, we instituted 
a mood booster to ensure that participants remained in a given mood state. In a 
questionnaire that participants completed prior to the experimental tasks, participants 
were asked to select and label two extremely anger-inducing events. For the Angry 
condition, participants were instructed to think and write about the second pre-chosen 
angry event.  In the Neutral condition, participants were instructed to think about their 
evening routing (e.g. brushing teeth, washing face, etc). Format of mood booster was 
identical to the first MIP. Participants wrote about each event for a maximum of 5 
minutes and then were instructed to think about each event for 30 seconds. The use of 
multiple memories in the same targeted state has been proven effective in other studies 
(Kross, Davidson, Weber, Ochsner, 2009).  
Sentence Completion Task The experimental paradigm consisted of 30 
sentences modified from existing sentence completion paradigms (Barton et al., 2005; 
Beard & Amir, 2009; Bloom & Fischler, 1980; Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards & 
Mathews, 1991; Huppert et al., 2007; Loevinger, 1985; Rotter, Rafferty, & Schachtitz, 
1949). Additional sentences were created by lab members. Sentences were designed or 
modified to illustrate ambiguous situations pertaining to threat, social settings, and 
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optimism. All sentences in the existing paradigm were created or modified grammatically 
to be in the first person. Sentences were presented with the last word missing, which is 
the disambiguating part. Participants were asked to complete the last word using a forced-
choice response style, in which, they completed the sentence with the best word from a 
set of 3 answer choices that were positive, negative, and neutral in valence.  
Self-report measures Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire- Short Form 
(MASQ; Clark & Watson, 1991). The MASQ is a 62-item questionnaire that assesses 
mood and anxiety symptoms. We included this measure in place of the BAI and the BDI 
to measure sub-clinical levels of anxiety and depression in order to understand how 
common levels of anxiety and depression influence MIP and the resolution of ambiguity.  
Participants were instructed to read through a list of feelings, sensations, and problems, 
and asked to indicate the degree to which they experienced this in the last week on a 5-
point likert scale, 1 indicating ‘not at all’ and 5 indicating ‘extremely’. The MASQ score 
is presented in 4 scales: General Distress: Anxiety, General Distress: Depression, 
Anxious Arousal, and Anhedonic Depression). General Distress scales measure 
nonspecific symptoms of anxiety and depression. Anxious Arousal measures 
physiological symptoms of anxiety, while Anhedonic Depression examines general 
negativity and activity level. The MASQ has shown good convergent validity across all 
subscales (r>.71 for all scales) (Watson, 2005).  
State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-2; Spielberger, 1999) was used 
to assess feelings of anger. The STAXI-2 is a 57-item measure that examines current 
feelings of anger, as well as trait displays of anger involving temperament and mood 
expression. Participants read statements and indicated the amount to which they currently 
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or typically identify with each statement. The STAXI-2 examines inward vs. outward 
expression (anger-in vs. anger-out) as well as verbal and physical expressions of anger. 
Higher scores indicate a greater degree of feelings or expression of anger. This measure 
has displayed high internal consistency (Spielberger, 1999).  
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Romer, 2004). The 
DERS is a 36-item measure that assesses dysfunction in emotion regulation. Participants 
read a sentence and based on a likert scale and noted how much the statement applied to 
them. High scores indicate a greater level of emotion dysregulation. In addition to a total 
score of emotion dysregulation, the DERS has several subscales that target specific 
aspects of emotion dysregulation (e.g. impulse control, lack of emotional awareness, etc). 
The DERS has been shown to have high internal consistency (α=.93) and construct 
validity as measured by statistically significant correlations between the DERS and 
another measure of emotion regulation (Generalized Expectancy for Negative Mood 
Regulation Scale) (Gratz & Romer, 2004).  Measuring emotion dysregulation allowed us 
to better assess participant’s ability to engage in assigned emotion regulation strategies.  
 The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire- Short Form (ERQ-SF); Egloff, 
Schmuckle, Burns, & Schwerdtfeger, 2006) is a 6-item questionnaire used to assess the 
utilization of Reappraisal and Suppression during a mood induction. The questionnaire is 
comprised of a 3-item Reappraisal scale and a 3-item Suppression scale. The degree to 
which participants engage in either emotion regulation strategy habitually is likely to 
influence interpretation bias and explicit emotion regulation.  
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS-SR; Liebowitz, 1987). The LSAS-SR is a 
24-item self-report measure that assesses fear and avoidance of several social situations. 
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We measured social anxiety in addition to generalized anxiety in order to better 
understand the influence of specific types of anxiety on the experimental paradigm.  
Similar to generalized anxiety, individuals with social anxiety often possess a negativity 
bias when resolving ambiguous information (Huppert et al., 2007). Participants were 
asked to read statements and indicate the degree of fear or anxiety they experienced as 
well as the degree of avoidant behavior they engaged in within the last week. Scores on 
the fear scale and avoidant scale are summed together. Higher scores indicate a greater 
level of social phobia. This measure has displayed good test-retest reliability (r=.083) 
with a time interval of 12 weeks and a high level of internal consistency (α=.95) (Baker, 
Heinrichs, Kim, & Hofmann, 2002).  
Personality Inventory-Revised: (NEO PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992) was used to 
assess personality characteristics. In particular, the assessment contains 60 items that 
comprise 5 different domains: Neuroticism, Extroversion, Openness to Experience, 
Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. Participants read statements and indicated the 
degree to which they agree or disagree with each item. This survey has reported high 
internal consistencies, ranging from .82 to .92 (Costa & McCrae, 1992). It is important to 
assess personality characteristics in participants as it has been shown that personality 
interacts with response modulation and interpretation of ambiguity (Stemmler & Wacker, 
2010).  
The Life Orientation Test Revised (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994) is 
a 10-item questionnaire used to measure trait optimism. Participants read each statement 
and indicated using a likert scale, the degree to which they agree or disagree with each 
item. Three items are phrased in a positive way and 3 in a negative manner, while the 
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remaining 4 items are used as fillers. Higher scores indicate greater levels of optimism. 
Similar to depression, optimism and pessimism have been found to influence decision-
making (Hey, Lotito, Maffioletti, 2010).  
D. Procedure  	  	  
 Participants were asked to attend 1, 60-minute, experimental session at the 
Inquiries in Affective Science Lab at Marquette University. All participants first read and 
signed a consent form. The experimental procedures took place on a 22-inch computer in 
the lab, using E-Prime (Version 2) software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.). 
Participants who agreed to participate then completed a demographics survey, DERS, 
MASQ, and STAXI, and LOT-R (See appendix for LOT-R results).  
Participants then completed baseline emotion ratings, in which they were asked to 
rate the extent that they were experiencing several emotions at the time of testing, using 
an automated 10 cm Visual Analogue Scale (VAS: 0-10), from ‘not at all’ (0) to 
‘extremely’ (10). Emotion descriptors were presented and rated separately, and included: 
Aggressive, Angry, Annoyed, Anxious, Aroused, Cheerful, Excited, Happy, Nostalgic, 
and Sad. Participants then completed a block of 6 items from the sentence completion 
paradigm to assess the presence of any baseline interpretation biases.  
Following baseline measures, the training phase took place and the experimenter 
explained the emotion regulation instructions. Participants were taught to Attend and 
Reappraise for both negative and neutral pictures. The experimenter left the room and the 
participant viewed a second set of standardized photos in order to practice instructed 
emotion regulation without the experimenter present. Before and after the negative and 
neutral training trials, participants rated the degree of negative affect they were currently 
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experiencing on a Visual Analogue Scale to ensure the efficacy of emotion regulation 
procedures.  
Following training, participants completed experimental procedures for both the 
Angry and Neutral mood conditions, counterbalanced across participants. In both 
conditions, participants completed MIPs, followed by a rating of emotion descriptors to 
ensure that the MIP was effective. The emotion regulation task then began and consisted 
of 2 phases: ‘Attend’ and ‘Reappraise’. Phase order was counterbalanced across 
participants. To begin, participants first saw one emotion regulation instruction for 4 
seconds (e.g. ‘Attend’ or ‘Reappraise’). Following this period, participants rated the 
degree of negative affect they were experiencing on  a scale of 1-10 (1= weak; 10= 
strong) using the visual analogue scale. Participants then completed a block of 6 items 
from the sentence completion paradigm.  
Between emotion regulation instructions, participants completed the mood 
booster in which they underwent a second MIP in the targeted state. Participants then saw 
the second emotion regulation instruction.  After writing and reflecting on this emotion, 
participants rated the degree of negative affect they were experiencing. Following the 
second emotion regulation (Attend or reappraise), participants then completed another 
block of 6 items from the sentence completion paradigm. At the end of each trial, 
participants viewed the word ‘RELAX’ for 5 seconds. At the end of each mood 
condition, participants rated several emotion descriptors.   
Each item of the sentence completion task began with a 2 second fixation point, 
followed by a screen presenting the sentence for 6 seconds. The next screen showed all 3 
answer choices: one with a positive valence, one with a neutral valence, and one with a 
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negative valence. Participants were instructed to choose the response that best completed 
the sentence. There were no time constraints on selecting a response.  Once experimental 
procedures were complete, participants completed another set of questionnaires that 
included the two forms of the ERQ-SF to assess both Angry and Neutral MIPs, LSAS, 
NEO (see appendix for LSAS and NEO results). 
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III. RESULTS 	  	  
A. Manipulation Check 	  	  
 To confirm the efficacy of each MIP, a series of repeated measures analysis of 
variances (rmANOVAs) were performed to ensure that participants’ subjective ratings of 
emotion descriptors were in the intended direction after each MIP. The emotion 
descriptors were first divided into 3 groups: Positive (Amused, Excited, Happy, Joyful, 
Peaceful), Negative (Angry, Annoyed, Anxious, Negative Affect, Sad), and Engagement 
(Aroused, Interested).  Three, Time x Emotion Descriptor rmANOVAs were conducted 
for each mood induction. In addition, average time to complete the MIP was noted. All 
statistical analyses were analyzed at an alpha level of .05 in SPSS 21.0 (SPSS, 2012).  
In the Angry MIP, participants wrote for an average of 3.5 minutes. Results from 
the Angry MIP, revealed significant main effects of time and emotion, qualified by a 
significant interaction (Table 1: rmANOVA results). Specifically, ratings of Negative 
emotions increased from pre- to post-Angry MIP, while Positive emotions decreased. The 
interaction effect in both analyses is explained by specific descriptors changing at 
different rates (see Figures 1 and 2). Finally, we examined Arousal separately using a 
paired t-test and found that this rating did not significantly change, t(102)=-1.44, p=.15. 
In essence, the Angry MIP was effective at increasing ratings of negative emotions, and 
decreasing positive emotions and did not change arousal. Ratings of ‘Negative Affect’ 
were considered especially important, as participants rated this descriptor multiple times 
throughout the experiment to track efficacy of mood boosters and emotion regulation in 
place of the full set of emotion descriptors to reduce participant fatigue. As such, this 
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descriptor was analyzed separately using a paired t-test and found that ratings of Negative 
Affect significantly increased from pre- to post- Angry MIP, t(102)=-11.49, p<.001.  
In the Neutral MIP, participants wrote for an average of 2.5 minutes. Identical 
analyses were conducted to examine emotion descriptor changes from pre- to post- 
Neutral MIP (Table 2: Results of rmANOVA analyzing change).  Results from the 
Negative emotion descriptors analysis found significant main effects of time and emotion 
that was qualified by a significant interaction. Specifically, all negative descriptors, 
except ‘Anxious’ decreased slightly, while Anxious ratings increased (See Figure 3). In a 
separate analysis, ratings of Negative Affect significantly decreased from pre- to post-
MIP, t(101)=2.70, p<.01. In the positive emotion descriptor analysis, only a main effect 
of emotion was observed, indicating that participants rated emotions differently, though 
they did not significantly change (Figure 4). Finally, a paired t-test indicated that ratings 
of Arousal did not significantly change, t(101)=-.70, p=.49. Results from these analyses 
indicate that the Neutral MIP did not change positive emotions, however, negative 
emotions mostly decreased, with the exception of anxiety. Comparing effect sizes, 
emotion ratings in the Angry condition (partial η2=0.69), were much larger than in the 
Neutral condition (partial η2=0.04), which is considered a small effect.  
To examine efficacy of mood induction boosters that were utilized between 
emotion regulation instructions, paired t-tests were conducted to examine ratings of 
negative affect following mood induction and mood booster. In the Angry condition, 
there was no significant difference between these ratings of Negative Affect, indicating 
that the Angry mood booster was effective at producing similar levels of negative affect 
as the initial mood induction: t(102), p=0.24. A second paired t-test was performed to 
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compare ratings of Negative Affect for the Neutral mood induction and the Neutral mood 
booster. The results indicate that participants rated significantly less negative affect in the 
Neutral mood booster compared to the Neutral mood induction: t(101), p<0.001.  
B. Mood Induction and Interpretation Bias (Aim 1) 	  	  
 The first aim was to determine whether mood had an effect on interpretation bias. 
We conducted a 3x3 rmANOVA of mood (baseline, neutral, negative) and response 
valence (Positive, Negative, and Neutral). (Table 5: Means and standard deviations of the 
number of Positive, Negative and Neutral endorsements Table 3: rmANOVA analysis).  
In these analyses, the statistic of interest was the interaction as it illustrates the proportion 
of endorsed response valences by condition. Any main effect of mood would be 
uninterruptible as each mood had the same number of sentences. Results revealed a 
significant main effect of Response Valence, F(2,94)=69.64, partial η2=0.60, p<.001, 
with a moderate effect size. This main effect was qualified by a statistically significant 
interaction effect for Mood and Response Valence, F(4,92)=7.59, partial η2=0.25, 
p<0.001, which is indicative of a medium effect size (Figure 5). To better understand this 
interaction effect, 3 1(Mood) x 3 (Response Valence) rmANOVAs were conducted. 
Specifically, a 1(Baseline) x 3(positive, negative, neutral responses) was conducted. 
Results indicated a significantly different number of responses endorsed at Baseline, 
F(2,94)=70.34, partial η2=0.60, p<0.001. Post hoc Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni 
correction revealed that participants endorsed significantly fewer Negative responses than 
Positive (Mean Difference=-1.69, p<0.001, Negative mean=0.90, Positive mean=2.58) or 
Neutral responses (Mean Difference=-1.65, p<0.001, Negative mean=0.90 Neutral 
mean=2.54). There was no significant difference between the numbers of Positive or 
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Neutral endorsed responses. These results indicate that at Baseline, participants exhibit a 
tendency to interpret ambiguous stimuli as positive or neutral. 
To examine interpretation bias in the Neutral condition a 1(Neutral) x 3(Response 
Valence) rmANOVA was conducted. Results indicated that participants endorsed 
significantly different number of response valences in the Neutral condition, 
F(2,100)=34.41, partial η2=0.41, p<0.001, with a medium effect size. Post hoc Pairwise 
comparisons using Bonferroni correction revealed that participants endorsed fewer 
Negative responses than Positive responses (Mean Difference=-0.76, p<0.01, Negative 
mean=1.20, Positive mean=1.95) or Neutral responses (Mean Difference=-1.66 p<0.001, 
Negative mean=1.20, Neutral mean=2.85). Additionally, participants endorsed more 
Neutral responses than Positive responses (Mean Difference=0.90, p<0.01, Positive 
mean=1.95, Neutral mean=2.85). As such, in the Neutral condition, participants were 
more likely to exhibit a Neutral bias.  
Finally, to examine interpretation bias in the Angry condition a 1(Angry) x 
3(Response Valence) rmANOVA was conducted. Results indicated that participants in 
the Angry condition endorsed significantly different number of valenced responses, 
F(2,101)=13.40, partial η2=0.21, p<0.001. Post hoc Pairwise comparisons using 
Bonferroni correction revealed that participants endorsed significantly fewer Negative 
responses compared to Positive responses (Mean Difference=-0.80, p<0.01, Negative 
mean=1.40, Positive mean=2.19) or Neutral responses (Mean Difference=-1.01, p<0.001, 
Negative mean=1.40, Neutral mean=2.41). There was no significant difference between 
the number of Positive and Neutral endorsements in the Angry condition.  
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Results from the Angry condition indicate that participants are likely to exhibit a 
positive or neutral bias in interpreting ambiguous stimuli. However, looking at the means, 
it is evident that there were more negative responses endorsed in the Angry condition 
compared to Neutral and Baseline. To explore this statistically, a 1 (Negative responses) 
x 3 (Mood) rmANOVA was conducted and revealed that significantly different number 
of negative responses were endorsed in each condition F(2,94)=6.07, partial η2=0.11, 
p<0.01. Post hoc pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction revealed that 
participants in the Angry condition endorsed more Negative responses compared to 
Baseline (Mean Difference=.47, p<.01, Baseline mean=.90, Angry mean=1.37), but not 
Neutral (Mean Difference=-.17, p=n.s. Neutral mean=1.2). In essence, while participants 
in the Angry condition are more likely to endorse positive or neutral responses to 
ambiguity, rates of negative endorsements also significantly increase, compared to 
Baseline. 
C. Negative Affect and Emotion Regulation (Aim 2) 	  	  
 To examine ratings of negative affect and emotion regulation strategy, a 2 (Mood 
Induction) x 2 (Emotion Regulation Strategy) was conducted (Table 7: Means and 
standard deviations of each variable Table 4: rmANOVA analysis). The Mood Induction 
variable had 2 levels: Angry and Neutral; and the Emotion Regulation variable had 2 
levels: Attend and Reappraise. Results revealed significant main effects of Mood 
Induction and Emotion Regulation Strategies, which were qualified by a significant 
interaction between these variables. The significant interaction effect of Mood Induction 
and Emotion Regulation revealed that negative affect for Reappraise was significantly 
lower than Attend, for the Angry condition only, F(1, 101)=8.98, p<0.01, partial η2=0.08 
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(Figure 2), with a small effect size. Follow-up paired t-tests confirmed this difference in 
negative affect ratings between Attend and Reappraise in the Angry condition, 
t(102)=5.76, p<0.001. The significant main effect of Mood Induction showed that 
participants rated higher levels of Negative Affect in the Angry condition, compared to 
the Neutral condition: F(1, 101)= 122.09, p<0.001, partial η2=0.55. The significant main 
effect of Emotion Regulation showed that participants rated less negative affect after the 
‘Reappraise’ instruction, compared to ‘Attend’: F(1, 101)=31.57, p<0.001, partial 
η2=0.24. Overall, results from these analyses revealed that Reappraise was effective at 
reducing Negative Affect ratings in the Angry condition, but not the Neutral condition.  
D. Interpretation Bias and Emotion Regulation (Aim 3) 	  	  
 To assess whether interpretation bias can be modified by emotion regulation 
strategies, separate 2(Emotion Regulation) x 3(Response Valence) rmANOVA were 
conducted. Emotion Regulation had 2 levels: Attend and Reappraise, and Response 
Valence had 3 levels: positive, negative, and neutral endorsed valences. As before, the 
main focus is on the interaction effect. In the Angry condition, results revealed a 
significant main effect of Response Valence, F(2,101)=29.09, partial η2=0.37, p<.001, 
with a medium effect size (see Table 9: Means and standard deviations of each variable 
Table 5: rmANOVA analysis). Pairwise comparison post hoc tests with Bonferroni 
correction revealed that participants endorsed significantly fewer Negative responses than 
Positive (Mean Difference=-.78, p<.001, Negative mean=1.37, Positive mean=2.16) or 
Neutral (Mean Difference=-1.11, p<.001, Neutral mean=2.49) responses. There was no 
significant difference between the numbers of Positive and Neutral endorsed responses 
(Mean Difference=-.33, p=n.s.) (See Figure 7). A follow-up paired samples t-test was 
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conducted to examine possible changes in the amount of Negative endorsements. Results 
revealed that Emotion Regulation did not significantly impact the amount of Negative 
endorsements, t(102)=.34, p=n.s. There was no significant main effect of Emotion 
Regulation or a significant interaction effect. Results indicate that Angry participants 
revealed a Positive/Neutral bias and that Emotion Regulation does not significantly 
impact this. 
 Results from the rmANOVA conducted for the Neutral condition revealed a 
significant main effect of response valence, F(2,100)=58.68, partial η2=.54, p<.001 with a 
medium effect size (see Table 11: Means and standard deviations of each variable Table 
6: rmANOVA analysis). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction 
revealed that the number of endorsements of each valence were significantly different 
from each other (see Figure 8), such that there were more Neutral responses than Positive 
(Mean Difference=.84, p<.001, Neutral mean=2.84, Positive mean=2.00) or Negative 
responses (Mean Difference=1.67, p<.001, Neutral mean=2.84, Negative mean=1.17). 
Additionally, there were fewer Negative responses than Positive (Mean Difference=-.83, 
p<.01). A follow-up paired t-test was conducted to examine Negative responses after 
Emotion Regulation strategies. Results revealed that there was no significant difference 
in Negative endorsements between Attend and Reappraise, t(101)=.43, p=n.s.. No 
significant main effect of Emotion Regulation or interaction effect was observed. Thus, 
results from this study indicate that participants in the Neutral condition exhibited a 
Neutrality bias and emotion regulation strategies did not significantly influence this.  
Taken together, results from the Angry and Neutral analyses indicated that 
Emotion Regulation does not significantly impact valenced response endorsement in 
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either the Angry or Neutral condition. Further, results restate Aim 1 findings that Angry 
participants exhibit a Positive/Neutral bias, where as Neutral participants show a 
Neutrality bias.  
E. Self-report measures and Reappraising Angry Events: Predicting Negative Affect 
and Interpretation Bias (Aim 4) 	  	  
To understand how information gathered from self-report measures, such as trait 
anxiety, depression, anger, and trait emotion regulation, impact the utilization and 
success of cognitive reappraisal, a series of regression analyses were conducted using 
scores from self report measures to predict Negative Affect and number of endorsed 
response valences following Reappraise trials from the Angry condition. (Note: To look 
at regression analyses examining the LOT-R, NEO, and LSAS, see the Appendix.) 
DERS  
 The first set of analyses examined the total score from the DERS which measures 
difficulties in emotion regulation. Separate bivariate regression analyses were conducted 
using the DERS total score as the independent variable to predict Negative Affect, 
Positive responses, Negative responses, and Neutral responses following Reappraisal of 
an angry autobiographical event. Results from the regression analysis predicting Negative 
Affect indicated that the DERS score significantly predicted negative affect following 
Reappraisal of an Angry event R2=0.08, F(1,100)=8.49, p<.001  with a modest effect size 
(R=.28) and that the DERS predicts 8% of the variance in negative affect ratings 
following Angry Reappraisal (See Table 7a for details). Additionally, the Constant 
(B=2.28) revealed that if the DERS score was 0, participants would rate negative affect 
after reappraisal as 2.28. Finally, the standardized beta (ß=.28, p<.001) indicated that 
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with one standard deviation increase in DERS scores, negative affect following Angry 
Reappraise would increase by almost one third of a standard deviation, indicating that 
with greater difficulties in emotion regulation, negative affect also increases.  
 Using the same independent variable of DERS scores to predict the number of 
Negative responses following Angry Reappraise revealed that the total DERS score 
significantly predicted the dependent variable, F(1,100)=9.15, p<.01, with a small effect 
size (R=.29). The DERS score predicted 8.4% of the variance in Negative responses 
following Angry Reappraise (See Table 7c for details). The standardized beta (ß=.29, 
p<.001) revealed that in the case that the DERS score increased by one standard 
deviation, negative responses would also increase by almost one third of a standard 
deviation, such that with greater difficulties in emotion regulation, the number of 
negative responses following Angry Reappraise also increases.  
Using the same independent variable of DERS scores to predict the number of 
positive responses following Angry reappraise indicated that the DERS score 
significantly predicted Positive responses F(1, 100)=7.64, p<.01), though the effect size 
was small (R=.27), with the DERS scale predicting 7% of the variance in Positive 
responses following Angry Reappraise (See Table 7b for details). The standardized beta 
(ß=-.27, p<.001) indicated that with one standard deviation increase in DERS scores, the 
number of positive responses would decrease by over one fourth of a standard deviation, 
thus with more difficulties endorsed on the DERS, the number of positive responses 
decreases.  
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Finally, the regression analysis to predict the number of Neutral responses 
following Angry Reappraise indicated that the DERS scale did not significantly predict 
the dependent variable, F(1,100)=0.00, p=n.s. (See Table 7d for details).  
STAXI 
 The second set of analyses utilized multiple regression to predict Negative Affect 
and the number of Negative, Positive, and Neutral endorsed responses following Angry 
Reappraise from the STAXI-II, which is used to measure state and trait anger. The first 
multiple regression model predicted Negative Affect ratings following Angry Reappraise 
from the independent variables of state and trait anger. This analysis revealed that state 
and trait anger did not significantly predict negative affect following Angry Reappraise, 
F(2,99)=2.11, p=n.s. (See Table 8a for details of the analysis). Despite the non-
significant model, the independent variable of state anger significantly predicted negative 
affect (ß=.21, p<.05), indicating more state anger predicts greater levels of Negative 
Affect following Angry Reappraise.  
  The second multiple regression analysis used the same independent variables to 
predict the number of positive responses. Results indicated that state and trait anger did 
not significantly predict the number of positive responses F(2,99)=1.88, p=n.s. (See 
Table 8b for details). The third multiple regression analysis predicted negative responses 
from state and trait anger. Results revealed that state and trait anger significantly predict 
the number of Negative responses F(2,99)=5.09, p<.01 with a medium effect size 
(R=.31), where state and trait anger ratings predicted 9.3% of the variance in Negative 
responses (See Table 8c). Examining individual predictors revealed that state anger alone 
significantly predicted the number of negative responses endorsed following Angry 
32	  
Reappraise (ß=.23, p<.05), such that one standard deviation increase in State Anger 
ratings, would increase the number of negative responses by almost one quarter of a 
standard deviation.   
 The final multiple regression analysis predicted the number of Neutral endorsed 
responses following Angry Reappraise. Results revealed that state and trait scores from 
the STAXI-II did not significantly predict the number of Neutral responses following 
Angry Reappraise, F(2,99)=0.02, p=n.s. (See Table 8d for details).  
MASQ 
 A third set of multiple regression analyses were conducted to predict Negative 
Affect and the number of Negative, Positive, and Neutral response valences following 
Angry Reappraise, using anxiety and depression scales from the MASQ. The first 
regression analysis predicted Negative Affect Following Angry Reappraise from the 
MASQ subscales. Results indicated that reported General Anxiety, General Depression, 
Anxious Arousal, and Anhedonic Depression did not significantly predict the dependent 
variable F(4,97)=1.48, p=n.s. (See Table 9a).  
 A second regression analysis used the same 4 independent variables to predict the 
number of positive responses following Angry Reappraise. Results revealed that General 
Anxiety, General Depression, Anxious Arousal, and Anhedonic Depression significantly 
predicted the number of positive responses following Angry Reappraise, F(4,97)=3.67, 
p<.01 with a medium effect size (R=3.6), where the MASQ subscales predicted 13% of 
the variance in the number of positive responses following Angry Reappraise (See Table 
9b for details). Examining individual predictors revealed that reports of Anhedonic 
Depression significantly predicted the number of positive responses following Angry 
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Reappraise (ß=-.33, p<.01), such that with a one standard deviation increase in 
Anhedonic Depression, the number of positive responses following Angry Reappraise 
decreased by one third of a standard deviation.  
 A separate multiple regression analysis was conducted to predict the number of 
Negative responses following Angry Reappraise from the same 4 subscales. Results 
revealed that General Anxiety, General Depression, Anxious Arousal, and Anhedonia 
scales significantly predicted the number of Negative responses endorsed following 
Angry Reappraise, F(4,97)=4.78, p=.001 with a medium effect (R=.41), such that MASQ 
scales predicted 17% of the variance in the number of Negative responses endorsed 
following Angry Reappraise (See Table 9c for details). Examination of individual 
predictors revealed that Anxious Arousal significantly predicted the number of Negative 
responses following Angry Reappraise (ß=-.29, p<.05), where one standard deviation 
increase in Anxious Arousal will result in almost one third of a standard deviation 
decrease in Negative endorsements following Angry Reappraise.   
 Multiple regression was also used to predict the number of endorsed Neutral 
responses following Angry Reappraise, using the MASQ scales as independent variables. 
Results indicated that these scales did not significantly predict the number of Neutral 
endorsed responses following Angry Reappraise, F(4,97)=1.15, p=n.s. (See Table 9d for 
details).  
ERQ-SF 
 A final set of multiple regression analyses were conducted to predict Negative 
Affect and the number of valenced responses following Angry Reappraise as the 
dependent variables, and the degree to which participants engaged in Reappraise and 
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Suppression during the Angry mood induction, measured by the ERQ-SF, as the 
independent variables. The first multiple regression analysis predicted Negative Affect 
following Angry Reappraise from Reappraise and Suppression scales from the ERQ-SF. 
Results revealed that engagement in Reappraise and Suppression did not significantly 
predict Negative Affect following Angry Reappraise, F(2,98)=2.08, p=n.s. (See Table 
10a for details of the analysis).  
 Engagement of Reappraisal and Suppression during the Angry mood induction 
was also used to predict the number of Positive responses endorsed following Angry 
Reappraise. Results revealed that the independent variables significantly predicted the 
number of positive endorsements following Angry Reappraise, F(2,98)=4.68, p<.05, with 
a medium effect size (R=.30), such that Reappraisal and Suppression explained 8.7% of 
the variance in the number of positive responses (See Table 10b for details). Examining 
individual predictors, revealed that using Reappraisal during the Angry mood induction 
significantly predicted the number of positive responses (ß=.30, p<.01), such that one 
standard deviation increase in Reappraisal raises the number of positive endorsements by 
almost one third of a standard deviation.  
 Multiple regression analysis, predicting the number of Negative endorsements 
from Reappraise and Suppression scales from the ERQ-SF, revealed that the independent 
variables significantly predicted the dependent variable, F(2,98)=8.43, p<.001 with a 
medium effect size (R=.38), where these scales predicted 14.7% of the variance in 
Negative endorsements following Angry Reappraise (See Table 10c for details). 
Examining individual predictors revealed that engagement in Reappraisal during the 
Angry mood induction significantly predicted negative responses (ß=-.38, p<.001), such 
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that where Reappraisal increases by one standard deviation, the number of Negative 
endorsements following Angry Reappraise decreases by almost two fifths of a standard 
deviation.  
 Finally, engagement in Reappraisal and Suppression in the Angry mood induction 
was used to predict the number of Neutral responses following Angry Reappraise. 
Results revealed that the independent variables did not significantly predict the dependent 
variable, F(2,98)=.25, p=n.s. (See Table 10d for details of the analysis), indicating that 
engagement in suppression and reappraisal during the MIP does not predict Neutral 
responses after Angry reappraisal.  
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IV. DISCUSSION 	  	  
The purpose of this study was to understand the role of cognitive reappraisal on 
explicit (self-report of negative affect) and implicit (interpretation bias) biases. Results 
showed that autobiographical recall was an effective technique to induce Angry and 
Neutral mood states. Cognitive reappraisal was effective at reducing explicit feelings of 
negative affect after autobiographical recall of an angry event. The implicit interpretation 
bias in the Angry and Neutral mood states showed that participants exhibited an equally 
positive and neutral bias to ambiguous information in both mood states, however, the 
Angry condition showed an increased negativity bias compared to baseline. Utilization of 
cognitive reappraisal did not significantly change interpretation bias in either the Angry 
or Neutral mood state. Finally, significant relationships were observed between state and 
trait dimensions of emotion and utilization of emotion regulation techniques, and 
interpretation bias. Specific findings and implications of each aim are discussed below.  
A. Explicit Bias and Mood State 	  	  
 Examining explicit bias (i.e. negative affect ratings) showed that subjective 
ratings of negativity were higher in the Angry condition than the Neutral condition. 
Further, instructed Reappraisal, but not Attending to emotions, was effective at reducing 
subjective feelings of negativity in the Angry condition. Cognitive reappraisal has been 
shown to be effective at reducing general negative emotionality (Denson, Moulds, & 
Grisham, 2012; Mauss, Cook, Cheng, & Gross, 2007; Ray, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2008; 
Szasz, Szentagotai, & Hofmann, 2011). Specifically regarding Anger, cognitive 
reappraisal is effective at reducing negativity in a variety of Angry MIPs including 
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autobiographical recall (Denson, Moulds, & Grisham, 2012; Ray, Wilhelm, & Gross, 
2008), guided imagery (Szasz, Szentagotai, & Hofmann, 2011) and anger provocations 
(Mauss, Cook, Cheng, & Gross, 2007).  
 Cognitive reappraisal was also implemented in the Neutral condition. Results 
indicated that while ratings of negative affect between Attend and Reappraise in the 
Neutral condition did not reach statistical significance, there was a trend for individuals 
to rate less negative affect following the Reappraise than Attend in the Neutral condition 
(p=0.07). Few studies have instructed participants to implement this strategy to Neutral 
stimuli. In fact, only two studies were found that included a similar condition (Golkar et 
al. 2012; Ray, McRae, Ochsner, & Gross, 2010. Ray et al. (2010) measured emotion 
regulation success using ratings of negative affect (as in the current study), while Golkar 
et al. (2012) measured subjective ratings of discomfort. Both studies found that 
reappraising both neutral and negative stimuli significantly decreased the dependent 
variable (Negative Affect or Discomfort) compared to Attend trials. Therefore, Neutral 
Reappraise results from the current study slightly differ from the current literature. One 
consideration that may account for this difference is that both aforementioned studies 
used picture stimuli to induce targeted moods, while the current study used 
autobiographical recall. It is plausible that when there is limited emotionality to the 
stimuli (i.e. Neutral), participants may find it easier to reappraise concrete stimuli, such 
as pictures, compared to more nebulous stimuli, such as autobiographical recall. Another 
confounding factor that precludes direct comparison with the current study is that when 
using standardized stimuli, researchers have normative measures of valence and arousal, 
which is absent in personalized stimuli. Thus the current stimuli may have differed on 
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either axis (valence or arousal) from the standardized stimuli that may explain the 
difference in subjective changes in negative affect to neutral stimuli.  
B. Mood and Interpretation Bias  	  	  
Results from interpretation bias analyses indicated that at Baseline, participants 
endorsed mainly positive and neutral responses, indicating a positive/neutrality bias and 
an absence of negativity bias. Compared to Baseline, participants in the Neutral condition 
endorsed more neutral responses and fewer positive responses, indicating a neutrality 
bias. Finally, participants in the Angry condition mainly endorsed positive and neutral 
responses, similar to the Baseline condition.  However, they also endorsed a greater 
number of negative responses relative to Baseline, indicating an increased negativity bias 
in the Angry condition. Results from this study are consistent with previous research. For 
example, Wenzel and Lystad (2005) found that angry participants displayed a negative 
interpretation bias in estimating the likelihood that negative events would occur. This 
study also included anxious participants and found that both conditions displayed a 
negative interpretation bias, though it was more pronounced in the Angry condition. 
Participants in this study were recruited based on trait anxiety and anger, while the 
current study induced targeted mood states. Despite this difference in sample, both state 
angry participants from the current study and trait angry participants from Wenzel and 
Lystad (2005) displayed an increased negativity bias. Similarly, Barrazzone & Davey 
(2009) found that when participants in angry mood states were presented with 
homographs that had a neutral or threat resolution and found that angry participants were 
more likely to endorse the threat resolution. Results from the current study indicate that 
Anger primes participants to interpret ambiguity in an increasingly negative manner, 
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while the literature indicates that anger leads individuals to display an overtly negative 
interpretation bias. This difference between the literature and the current study may be a 
result of the experimental interpretation bias paradigm (see Limitations for details). 
Nevertheless, a conservative interpretation of the evidence is that Anger increases the 
likelihood that participants interpret ambiguity negatively.    
 Conversely, several studies from the risk literature found that angry participants 
were more likely to make optimistic judgments about risk (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 
Lerner & Keltner, 2001). The idea that angry participants are likely to display optimism 
in risk perceptions seems contrary to findings in the current study. In fact, the appraisal 
tendency theory (Lerner & Kelnter, 2000) helps explain this difference. Specifically, this 
theory posits that emotions trigger changes in cognitions that influence judgments and 
decision-making that are based on levels of certainty. For example, the authors posit that 
anger is an emotion that is associated with assertiveness that in turn influences feelings of 
certainty in control. The appraisal-tendency theory then posits that angry individuals, 
who tend to be more assertive, will feel they have control over uncertain events, which 
then influences perceptions of risk to be less threatening. This theory was corroborated 
using a series of studies that employed both trait anger and induced anger (Lerner & 
Kelnter, 2001). Despite the confidence of angry decision makers, there is no evidence 
that these decisions are advantageous. Research has shown that angry individuals process 
information at a shallow level, employing shortcuts, such as stereotyping and reliance on 
superficial cues to make judgments that influence decision making. This was in contrast 
to sad participants who used more complex heuristics in making judgments 
(Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994). Reliance on superficial cues to make 
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decisions puts angry decision makers at risk for making uninformed and potentially less 
advantageous decisions, despite feeling confident in their optimistic perceptions of risk.   
 Taken together, angry individuals display a negative interpretation bias to stimuli 
that examine general optimism in future events (predicting the likelihood of a negative 
event occurring), threat (homographs) and decision-making in situations that pertain to 
general optimism, social settings, and threat (the current paradigm). However, anger is 
also associated with an optimistic view toward risk assessment, though this may be due to 
increased assertiveness and impulsivity. Therefore, optimistic risk assessments may not 
translate to optimism in other areas that imply positive affect.  As such, we can conclude 
that Anger increases the likelihood that individuals will display a negative interpretation 
bias.  
C. Emotion Regulation and Interpretation Bias  	  	  
In the current study, interpretation bias did not change with instructed emotion 
regulation strategies. In the Angry condition, participants endorsed mainly positive and 
neutral responses with fewer negative responses in both Attend and Reappraise trials. In 
the Neutral condition, participants endorsed mostly neutral responses, followed by 
positive responses. Participants endorsed significantly less negative responses than 
positive or neutral. Similar to the Angry condition, this pattern held for both Attend and 
Reappraise trials in the Neutral condition. Contrary to the hypothesis, evidence from both 
mood conditions indicated that emotion regulation did not significantly change the 
interpretation of ambiguous information. Few studies have examined the relationship of 
changing interpretation biases through emotion regulation; however, other studies have 
experimentally modified the interpretation bias to understand the resulting behavioral 
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changes (Beard & Amir, 2008; Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009; Wilson, MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006). For example, MacLeod et al. (2006) experimentally 
induced a threatening or nonthreatening interpretation bias. Threat bias was induced by 
continually encouraging participants to access threat meanings to homographs through 
numerous trials, and filling in missing letters to threat homographs. Feedback was given 
at each trial to encourage the generation of threat interpretations. Participants who 
underwent the threat interpretation training exhibited a significantly higher level of state 
anxiety following the video stressor than those who did not. Results indicate that 
experimentally modifying interpretation bias can increase emotional reaction in the 
targeted valence, suggesting a potentially causal role for interpretation bias and 
subsequent emotional reactions. Results from the current study found that interpretation 
bias was not informative in understanding the cognitive impact of emotion regulation as 
it was in MacLeod et al. (2006). However, given that the current results show that Angry 
participants exhibited an increased negativity bias, it may be that this bias maintained the 
generation of further negative resolutions. Thus, perhaps the increased negativity bias 
may have been less amenable to change.  
Another study examined interpretation bias as a means to reduce distress. 
Specifically, Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook, and Yiend (2007), induced a positive 
interpretation bias in trait anxious individuals. Training was completed over 4 sessions in 
a graded fashion, such that the degree of positivity in the stimuli increased throughout the 
sessions. Interpretation bias was induced by presenting participants with a description of 
a situation and then presenting forced-choice questions where the positive resolution was 
the only response that semantically fit. At the end of training, participants were able to 
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access positive resolutions to ambiguous situations without assistance. Further, scores of 
trait anxiety decreased from pre to post training. Results suggest that inducing a positive 
interpretation bias may be helpful in treating emotional disorders, such as anxiety.  
Together, these studies show that altering interpretation bias is effective at 
changing mood and behavior. The aim of the current study was to see if instructed 
cognitive reappraisal was a powerful enough tool to alter interpretation bias. Results 
showed that this strategy was effective in managing negative emotionality, but not in 
changing behavior. One explanation is that the aforementioned studies used more 
cognitive-based tasks (filling in the missing letters of words, etc) that directly focused on 
the interpretation bias. Further, participants in the described studies underwent intensive 
training procedures that likely resulted in an automatic response style to the desired 
effect. The current procedures utilized a training phase, though as it was more 
emotionally based, it was less structured and incorporated fewer trials. This may partially 
explain the different results in interpretation bias. However, it is unclear if altering 
interpretation bias has longer lasting cognitive results compared to cognitive reappraisal. 
As such, it appears that interpretation bias can help explain thoughts and behaviors, 
though the utility of this strategy clinically warrants further research.  
D. State and Trait Emotion, Cognitive Reappraisal, and Interpretation Bias  	  	  
Information from self-report data gave us more insight into how participants 
responded to both the emotion regulation task as well as interpretation bias. As the 
primary interests in this study were anger, cognitive reappraisal, and interpretation bias, 
we performed analyses that targeted this information. Namely, self-report data was used 
to predict negative affect and responses from the sentence completion task after Angry 
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Reappraisal. We found that individuals who endorsed greater emotion dysregulation on 
the DERS, rated higher levels of negative affect following Angry Reappraise. This 
indicates that individuals who endorsed greater emotion dysregulation in general, did not 
experience the same benefits from instructed emotion regulation (as evidenced by 
subjective ratings of negativity). This finding conceptually makes sense and fits with the 
research that states that individuals who generally experience emotion dysregulation also 
experience more negative emotions, including anger, and display greater physiological 
responses to anger provocations, compared to individuals who regularly engage in 
healthy emotion regulation (Mauss, Cook, Cheng, & Gross, 2007). Therefore, individuals 
who are emotionally dysregulated may require more extensive training to benefit from 
emotion regulation. 
Further, in the current study, individuals who reported more emotion 
dysregulation were also found to have an increased negativity bias and a decreased 
positivity bias following Angry Reappraisal. This is consistent with a previous study that 
examined the way implicit evaluation of emotion regulation paralleled the emotional 
experience of anger (Mauss, Evers, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2006). This study used a 
derivation of the Implicit Association Task (IAT) to measure implicit evaluation of 
engagement in emotion regulation. Results indicated that those who valued emotion 
regulation experienced less anger and fewer negative thoughts following an anger 
provocation. The current results suggest that individuals who display emotion 
dysregulation will not experience the benefits of cognitive reappraisal, as corroborated by 
negative affect ratings. As such, it is unclear if instructed regulation was not as successful 
due to baseline dysregulation of emotion, or less value placed in emotion regulation.  
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Understanding anger was a central component to this study. Anger has been 
associated with a particularly pronounced negative interpretation bias, recurrent negative 
thinking, and other unique cognitions (Wenzel & Lystad, 2005; Wilkowski & Robinson, 
2008). Therefore, understanding the influence of state and trait anger on the current 
paradigm was of central importance. Results showed that individuals who endorsed 
higher levels of anger, and especially state anger reported more negative affect following 
Angry Reappraisal. Research shows that individuals who report high levels of anger, tend 
to regularly engage in negative emotion regulation strategies such as rumination and 
catastrophizing (Martin & Dahlen, 2005), indicating that they have more practice and 
automatic cognitions related to these harmful strategies. Therefore, as cognitive 
reappraisal differs greatly from these strategies, instructed reappraisal may be more 
difficult and require more practice in order for the strategy to be used effectively.  
Similarly, individuals who reported greater levels of anger, and once again 
particularly state anger, displayed greater negativity biases. As indicated by analyses of 
negative affect, it appears that such individuals did not benefit from cognitive reappraisal. 
Taken together, individuals who reported greater levels of state anger reported more 
negative affect and greater negativity biases following cognitive reappraisal of an angry 
event. It is plausible that these individuals did not fully engage in reappraisal, as these 
results are similar to what would be expected in unregulated anger. Interestingly, 
significant results from this analysis revealed that state anger as compared to trait anger, 
drove these results. Given the nature of this sample, it is plausible the majority of 
participants do not experience pathological levels of trait anger, and therefore state anger 
was more influential in this result. 
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The current paradigm assessed instructed utilization of cognitive reappraisal. 
However, it has been shown that some individuals automatically regulate their emotions 
in a plethora of situations (Mauss, Bunge, & Gross, 2007), which likely impacts mood 
induction techniques and instructed reappraisal. To understand the usage of emotion 
regulation techniques during the mood induction, the ERQ-SF was administered. Results 
indicated that individuals who endorsed engaging in reappraisal during the MIP, 
displayed an increased positivity bias and less of a negativity bias. Results indicate that 
when individuals reappraise while experiencing a negative emotion, interpretation biases 
change to be more positive. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
utilization of effective emotion regulation techniques during the emotional experience 
reduces feelings of negativity. This likely speaks to implicit and habitual use of emotion 
regulation. Several studies have indicated that implicit value and habitual use of emotion 
regulation show different emotion profiles compared to individuals who do not regularly 
engage in healthy emotion regulation strategies (Mauss, Evers, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2006; 
Memedovic, Grisham, Denson, & Moulds, 2010). Such evidence may speak to implicit 
emotion regulation facilitating effective explicit emotion regulation, which may then lead 
to the expression of interpretation bias. There is growing evidence that explicit emotion 
regulation is a cognitively demanding process that is demanding of executive control and 
working memory capacities (McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John, & Gross, 2012). As such, it is 
probable that individuals who greater benefitted from instructed cognitive reappraisal in 
the current study are individuals who do not find the process as taxing and perhaps are 
more likely to engage in automatic emotion regulation.  
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Clinical anxiety and depression have demonstrated threat interpretation bias 
(Richards, Reynolds, & French, 1992) and depressive interpretation biases (Dunn et al., 
2009) respectively. Assessing levels of anxiety and depression are important in this study 
in order to understand the efficacy of instructed emotion regulation in such individuals as 
it is directly applicable to clinical experiences. Results from analyses investigating 
depression and anxiety symptoms indicated that individuals who rated higher levels of 
anxiety and depression, in particular anhedonic symptoms (as measured by the MASQ) 
reported a reduced positivity bias. There is some evidence in the literature suggesting that 
in place of looking at overt interpretation bias, examining the reduction of positivity bias 
aids in identifying depressive symptoms (Dunn, Stefanovitch, Buchan, Lawrence, & 
Dalgleish, 2009). In particular, Dunn et al. (2009) used a working memory task without 
feedback and examined self-judgments. Results indicated that a reduced positivity bias in 
this task was associated with anhedonic symptoms. These data can be extended to the 
current study in that anhedonic symptoms uniquely predicted a reduced positivity bias to 
an ambiguous stimulus. 
Conversely, individuals who endorsed higher levels of anxiety and depression, 
and especially anxious arousal, reported a decreased negativity bias. This finding was 
surprising, as negative interpretation biases tend to be prominent in anxiety disorders 
(Franklin et al., 2005; Huppert et al., 2007; Wilson, et al., 2006). There were 2 measures 
of anxiety in this model: anxious arousal and general anxious distress. That general 
anxious distress did not contribute to this finding, it appears that the physiological arousal 
component explains this result. Nes, Segerstrom, and Sephton, (2005) found that some 
forms of positive emotions, such as optimism are associated with greater skin 
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conductance responses and increased Cortisol. Therefore, trait factors such as optimism 
that lead to a decreased negativity bias, may be physiologically taxing and mirroring 
symptoms of anxious arousal (e. g. sweaty palms, racing, heart, etc).  
 There are several strengths that should be noted in this study. First, we used a 
forced-choice paradigm, in which participants were instructed to select one of three 
differently valenced responses. Several studies utilize a free-choice paradigm (Huppert et 
al., 2007, Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010). This has some intuitive appeal in assessing 
interpretation bias in that we can understand more precisely how responses are generated, 
however the process of generating responses requires cognitive effort and may be less 
susceptible to picking up interpretation biases. Also, participants may generate uncodable 
responses. Second, the use of the current paradigm included the option to resolve the 
ambiguity using positive, negative, and neutral valenced responses. Other studies include 
only 2 valenced responses, such as threat and benign resolutions (Beard & Amir, 2009) or 
negative and benign resolutions (Hindash & Amir, 2011). Using positive, negative, and 
neutral resolutions allow us to understand the full spectrum of interpretation bias in 
certain mood states.  
 Another strength of this study is that there is limited empirical data that speaks to 
interpretation bias and emotion regulation in a nonclinical population. It has been shown 
that interpretation bias plays a role in maintaining psychological distress in nonclinical 
(Wilson et al., 2006) and clinical population (Franklin et al., 2005). It is also know that 
cognitive reappraisal has been shown to be effective to decrease explicit distress 
(Denson, Moulds, & Grisham, 2012; Fabiansson, Denson, Moulds, Grisham, & Schira, 
2012; Mauss, Cook, Cheng, & Gross, 2007), however the extent of cognitive reappraisal 
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is not fully understood until we understand it’s role in interpretation bias. The current 
study did not find significant results in interpretation bias and emotion regulation, 
however, further research should be conducted in this area using different paradigms and 
emotions. This would help us better understand the pervasive effect of different emotions 
(e.g. anger, anxiety, etc) as well as the complete effectiveness of different emotion 
regulation strategies.  
Results from this study show promising implications for cognitive reappraisal and 
subclinical anger on reducing explicit feelings of negativity. However, there are a few 
limitations that should be noted. First, it is difficult to separate implicit emotion 
regulation in this study. We used the ERQ-SF as a proxy measure for implicit emotion 
regulation. That is, it measured their use of cognitive reappraisal during the mood 
induction without being instructed to do so. Not surprisingly, individuals who engaged in 
cognitive reappraisal during Angry autobiographical recall showed differences in 
implicit, but not explicit interpretation biases. Engagement in Suppression did not have a 
significant impact on implicit or explicit biases. The current model showed that instructed 
cognitive reappraisal was effective in reducing negative affect following an Angry event, 
which may have had a stronger effect in individuals who engaged in automatic 
reappraisal during the MIP. However, the ERQ-SF only measured Cognitive Reappraisal, 
and Suppression, as such it is unclear if other forms of implicit emotion regulation, such 
as distraction or acceptance would influence the results.  
 Second, while the current interpretation bias paradigm had several strengths, it 
may have been susceptible to other processes, such as social desirability and that some 
items were not subtle in assessing the desired variables. For example, one item from the 
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task was, ‘Today I had a good day, which means that tomorrow will probably be 
_______.’. In this situation a participant may not want to be seen as overly negative, and 
thus change their responses accordingly. Using other paradigms, such as a word 
association task may help us understand interpretation bias without as much interference 
if social desirability is playing a role.  
In conclusion, the current study demonstrated that cognitive reappraisal is an 
effective tool to reduce negative emotionality in angry mood states. Further, individuals 
in angry mood states displayed an increasingly negative interpretation bias from baseline, 
indicating that anger influences cognitions. Despite efficacy of regulating negative 
emotionality in anger, cognitive reappraisal was not effective in reducing negative 
interpretation bias, indicating that perhaps anger is a more difficult emotion to implicitly 
modulate. Finally, the current study found that individuals who engage in automatic 
cognitive reappraisal while experiencing an emotion, display less negative emotionality 
and a greater positivity bias following instructed reappraisal. Further, individuals who 
experience high state anger or typically struggle to engage in healthy emotion regulation 
experienced greater negative emotionality and an increased negativity bias following 
instructed reappraisal. Such results indicate that state and trait emotion influence 
implementation of cognitive reappraisal and the resulting interpretation biases.  
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APPENDIX A: TABLES 	  	  
Table 1 
Repeated Measures ANOVAs Evaluating Emotion Descriptor Change in Angry Induction  
    df F partial η2 
Negative Emotion Descriptors     
 Time 1, 102 231.02** 0.69 
 Emotion 4, 99 23.75** 0.49 
 Time x Emotion 4, 99 38.78** 0.61 
Positive Emotion Descriptors     
 Time 1, 102 127.48** 0.56 
 Emotion 4, 99 4.59* 0.16 
 Time x Emotion 4, 99 12.33** 0.33 
Engagement Descriptors       
 Time 1, 102 1.47 0.01 
 Emotion 1, 102 22.48** 0.18 
 Time x Emotion 1, 102 20.21** 0.17 
N=103     
*p<.01, **p<.001    
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Table 2 
Repeated Measures ANOVAs Evaluating Change in Emotion Descriptors in Neutral 
Induction  
    df F partial η2 
Negative Emotion Descriptors     
 Time 1, 101 4.13* 0.04 
 Emotion 4, 98 18.36** 0.43 
 Time x Emotion 4, 98 3.06* 0.11 
Positive Emotion Descriptors    
 Time 1, 101 0.27 0.00 
 Emotion 4, 98 24.08** 0.50 
 Time x Emotion 4, 98 1.19 0.05 
Engagement Descriptors    
 Time 1, 101 0.13 0.00 
 Emotion 1, 101 40.75** 0.29 
 Time x Emotion 1, 101 0.50 0.01 
N=102     
*p<.01, **p<.001    
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Table 3  
Repeated Measures ANOVA Evaluating Different Interpretation Bias by MIP (Aim 1) 
  df F partial η2 
MIP 1, 95 2.021 0.02 
Response Valence 2, 94 69.64** 0.60 
MIP x Response Valence 4, 92 7.59** 0.25 
*p<.01, **p<.001    
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Table 4  
Repeated Measures ANOVAs Evaluating Change in Negative Affect (Aim 2) 
  df F partial η2 
Mood Induction 1, 101 122.09** 0.55 
Emotion Regulation 1, 101 31.57** 0.24 
Mood Induction x Emotion Regulation 1, 101 8.98* 0.08 
*p<.01, **p<.001   
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Table 5 
Repeated Measures ANOVAs Evaluating Change in Interpretation Bias and per Emotion 
Regulation in the Angry condition (Aim 3) 
  df F partial η2 
Emotion Regulation 1, 102 1 0.01 
Response Valence 2, 101 29.09** 0.37 
Emotion Regulation x Response Valence 2, 101 0.46 0.01 
*p<.01, **p<.001    
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Table 6  
Repeated Measures ANOVAs Evaluating Change in Negative Affect (Aim 3) 
  df F partial η2 
Emotion Regulation 1, 101 1.00 0.01 
Response Valence 2, 100 58.68** 0.54 
Emotion Regulation x Response Valence 2, 100 0.20 0.00 
*p<.01, **p<.001    
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Table 7  
Results of regression analysis predicting Negative Affect and valenced responses after 
Angry Reappraise: DERS (Aim 4) 
 Negative Affect (a) Positive Bias (b) Negative Bias (c) Neutral Bias (d) 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
DERS 0.03 0.01 0.28** -0.02 0.01 -0.27** 0.02 0.01 0.29** 0.00 0.01 0.01 
R2 0.08 .07 .08 0.00 
F for change in R2 8.49** 7.64** 9.15** 0.00 
*p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table 8  
Results of regression analysis predicting Negative Affect and valenced responses after 
Angry Reappraise: STAXI (Aim 4) 
 Negative Affect (a) Positive Bias (b) Negative Bias (c) Neutral Bias (d) 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
State Anger 0.10 0.05 0.21* -0.03 0.03 -0.13 0.06 0.03 0.23* -0.02 0.02 -0.11 
Trait Anger -0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.10 0.03 0.03 0.13 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 
R2 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.02 
F for change in R2 2.11 1.88 5.09** 0.94 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 9  
Results of regression analysis predicting Negative Affect and valenced responses after 
Angry Reappraise: MASQ (Aim 4) 
 Negative Affect (a) Positive Bias (b) Negative Bias (c) Neutral Bias (d) 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
General Anxiety 0.30 1.12 0.08 -0.03 0.03 -0.16 0.04 0.03 0.26 -0.02 0.02 -0.12 
General Depression 0.06 0.03 2.46 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.13 -0.02 0.02 -0.19 
Anxious Arousal -0.04 0.04 -0.16 0.03 0.02 0.19 -0.04 0.02 -0.29* 0.02 0.02 0.13 
Anhedonia   -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.33** 0.02 0.01 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.22 
R2 0.06 0.13 0.17 0.05 
F for change in R2 1.48 3.67** 4.78** 1.15 
*p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table 10 
Results of regression analysis predicting Negative Affect and valenced responses after 
Angry Reappraise: ERQ-SF (Aim 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Negative Affect (a) Positive Bias (b) Negative Bias (c) Neutral Bias (d) 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Reappraise -0.15 0.08 -0.19 0.14 0.58 0.30** -0.17 0.04 -0.38*** 0.01 0.04 0.03 
Suppress -0.07 0.06 0.12 -0.03 0.34 -0.08 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.06 
R2 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.01 
F for change in R2 2.08 4.68* 8.43*** 0.25 
*p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001 
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APPENDIX B: FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Mean Ratings of Negative Emotion Descriptors before and after Angry MIP 
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Figure 2. Mean Ratings of Positive Emotion Descriptors before and after Angry MIP 
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Figure 3. Mean Ratings of Negative Emotion Descriptors before and after Neutral MIP 
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Figure 4. Mean Ratings of Positive Emotion Descriptors before and after Neutral MIP 
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Figure 5. Mean (95% CI) Interpretation Bias per Mood Condition (Aim 1) 
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Figure 6. Mean Negative Affect Ratings per Mood Condition and Emotion Regulation 
Strategy (Aim 2) 
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Figure 7. Mean (95% CI) Interpretation bias in Angry Condition and Emotion Regulation 
(Aim 3) 
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Figure 8. Mean (95% CI) Interpretation Bias in Neutral Condition and Emotion 
Regulation (Aim 3) 
 
